Nigeria-Biafra War Veteran, Col. Joseph Achuzia - the Hannibal of Biafra, Has Died

Col Joe Achuzia, the Hannibal of Biafra

passed away yesterday morning at the a  Medical Centre in Asaba, Biafra after a brief illness.  One of the children of the deceased, Mr. Benedict

Col Joe Achuzia - the Hannibal of Biafra

Onyeka Achuzia, formally broke the news of the demise of the veteran soldier.

One of Col Achuzia's Interviews on the Nigeria-Biafra War given to the Nation Online

Biafra Did NOT Surrender

 Col. Joe Achuzia was one of the major figures that held Biafra together while the Nigerian Civil war lasted. He commanded almost all the major sectors in the Biafran Army and also ensured that discipline was enforced throughout the duration of the war. Before the war ended, he was in charge of operations in the whole enclave called Biafra. This position made it possible for him to begin the necessary overtures to end the war. While Ojukwu was away, he took over control of the forces and then made the appropriate contacts to bring the war to an end.

In this interview with Edozie Udeze, he debunks some of the claims made by Gen. Alabi Isama and Gen. Alani Akinrinade in their recent interviews. Gen. Alabi Isama in his latest book on the war alleged that Mid- western officers were alienated. Is it really true that as the Commander-in-Chief of the Biafran Armed Forces, Chukwuemeka Odumegwu Ojukwu, did not trust some of the Midwestern Igbo officers while the war lasted? It is not true. Why I say it is not true is that for Biafra to have lasted so long, it was as a result of the efforts of the Mid-western officers. This was because Biafra was really being hard pushed until the mid-west operation began. And the Midwest officers that were supposed to go across, Alabi-Isama was one of them. Even then my own journey into the mid west when Banjo crossed into Mid west, Alabi too was one of those that I contacted. But somewhere along the line, after our meeting, after we gave him some instructions to follow across, Alabi defected. And he didn’t come back. So, for him to say that Ojukwu didn’t like some Mid west officers couldn’t be true. This was so because it was the Mid-west officers, all the way to the lower ranks, that really held Murtala from crossing over the bridge thereby entering Biafra. This was when Murtala started his so-called operation to cross the Niger. It was mid western officers who fought and sustained the momentum. These were the 52 and 57 brigades that are also manned by the Mid west officers. It is unfortunate that many people from hindsight now after over 40 years of the war are writing books on the war. This is an after- thought after having read over other people’s works on the war, reading newspaper comments and other people’s statements and interviewing people. Now, they have got themselves in the position as being authority on the war. I wouldn’t take Alabi’s document as a serious one. The only aspect of his statement that really deserves comment and which shows his inability to appreciate the war situation and reporting it as it were, was his reporting what did not happen in his presence. He talked about the end of the war, mentioning the participants. He is not in the position to say what he said about the end of the war. He wasn’t there. The first person who was there was General Alani Akinrinade.

Also Tomoye. Then Tomoye was not a substantive colonel. The command that reached Orlu was Tomoye’s command. And it was Tomoye’s officer that my men and in a night operation and captured them that made it possible for me to take the step I took by declaring that everybody should lay down their arms. Then I said we could be announcing it until I was able to bring Akinrinade into my headquarters. The narrative by Alabi shows ignorance of what happened that day. That’s what I can say about that. The only person that many a time I look at and say let sleeping dogs lie is General Akinrinade. This was because of his behaviour from the moment we met was officer-like. And he conducted himself in a way that endeared him to me that up till date, we are still friends. Alabi, however, was right in one thing that the war had already ended before General Obasanjo came into the picture. And he came on the scene after I allowed General Akinrinade to make a call to him. And he told him that if he didn’t come, he might stand to lose his officers who were under my control then. When Akinrinade came, he came with only a few soldiers. We met at Orlu, I didn’t go to Owerri to look for any of them. Now, we told Tomoye to phone him because Tomoye stood to lose all his officers and in Brigade they ventured into our territory near Orlu. We assured Tomoye that we had already started to take steps to bring the war to an end. His officers that were collected were already deposited near my office in Igbo-ukwu. As a result, it wasn’t proper for me to claim that I went to Owerri looking for who to surrender to. Surrender who or what to who? After all, it was in my house while discussing with Akinrinade that we decided that in that instance we were bringing the war to an end.

There was indeed no winner, no vanquished. The war had deteriorated into a state of stalemate, whereby we were trading one bullet for another. By this time our men were crisis- crossing the war front because both the Nigerian soldiers and our soldiers were tired of the whole thing; the whole episode. Could you please elaborate more on the last days of the war? Let me also elaborate more on the events of the last days… I read in the internet Akinrinade’s rejoinder. So I asked for it to be printed out. Akinrinade is the last person I expected to sanction what Alabi-Isama wrote or said about the end of the war. Isama wasn’t there. Akinrinade was there. Tomoye was there. The rest were just junior officers. Those collected that night of 11th were junior officers and they were in charge of a battalion which made it possible for us to move. It was almost a disaster. We could have capitalised on it but we were on the quest to bring the war to an end. Hence, we detained them at the DMI office in Igbo-ukwu, got them to send a message to their commander, Tomoye. Tomoye replied that he would contact Owerri. The officer at Owerri tactical headquarters, Col. Oni who replied that Obasanjo said he would send his chief-of-staff, Akinrinade, to come and negotiate with us.

We were also mindful of the fact that during the pogrom in the North, the majority of the soldiers as far as the North was concerned, Midwest was an Igbo land. It was in fact an afterthought when they tried to woo the Benins, the Urhobo’s and so on, forgetting that the Benins and Urhobos were some of those they killed during the pogrom. So, ranging them against us by pacifying them as they did when they created Cross-River and Rivers States, it was not done to appease the North. No. it was done to range them against the Igbo people by telling them that they were sufficient to be on their own as states. And that they should not be an appendage of the Igbos. They even forgot that we could have done the same by moving into the North, bringing the Middlebelt against the Fulanis. But we didn’t do that. So, that was what it was like. Okay, were all these part of the blunders that prolonged the war? Of course, yes. If we had played the game the way Nigeria played it, we would still be in the battle field today. But our people have a saying that the hen with so many chicks doesn’t know how to run in a battle situation.

At what point did the Biafran high command begin to consider some of the officers as saboteurs and what did it take one to be so considered? In many war situations, the word sabotage is a constant and recurrent decimal. This is so because not all believe in the cause that brought about the war situation. People have different ideas and ideals. And some people, according to their belief, put themselves in the position where they were either the loyalists or considered anti-war efforts. This was what gave rise to the word saboteur. So it happens everywhere and it occurs everywhere. You have nicknamed the Air Raid. How did this name come about? Oh, no, no. I can’t continue to dwell on this. But you’ve not told it to us before? Okay, why I say so is that soldiers, especially in a conflict situation have the tendency for giving one name or the other to their officers, depending on the situation they find themselves. So, they did that when they wanted. You didn’t start out as a commissioned officer, but rose to be a force to reckon with. How did it happen? No, no. you see, people don’t seem to understand that soldiering is an art. Just like engineering or medicine, when a doctor is made to be so. You cannot just go into an operating room, pick up your instruments and begin to work, if you haven’t been trained. So also in a war situation. You cannot go into battle field and carry out all the norms necessary for an officer who had been trained over the years. A civilian cannot plan war and execute war. It requires a trained military officer to confuse and configure the situation and operate. That is why many a time people say what they like and I don’t care. It doesn’t affect people like me; I am not interested.

The situation occured within the purview of my duty and I operated just to show what I was trained for. After that I retired into a civilian life. What really happened – did you actually kill Haliday, the owner of Silver Valley Hotel in the presence of his wife and daughter as alleged by General Alani Akinrinade? That’s a lie. You see, when the war ended, Nigerian officers didn’t know what to do about me. First, they couldn’t reach me. Every effort made to kill me did not succeed. Haliday was a friend. My house, before the war started, was a stone’s throw from Chief Haliday’s house. If such a thing happened, why was it only at the end of the war that we started hearing that I was the one that killed him? I commanded; I took over in Port Harcourt, when Port Harcourt was falling. And all that participated there will give testimony that I never picked a gun and shot him. I never picked my gun and shot at somebody. Why should I? I had soldiers who could do that. But instead, they tried to foist the death of Haliday on me. That exactly was what they’ve been saying; that I had been killing people indiscriminately while the war lasted. That also is not true. It took the way the war ended for most Biafrans to realise that it was really a lie that whenever I saw somebody I’d shoot. Shoot for what? For what purpose? And if that was the case, would I lay my life on the line to bring the war to an end? After all, the people who asked that the war be brought to an end are still alive. People like P.K. Nwokedi, a former justice of Enugu. Louis Mbanefo too. These were the people who came to my house and pleaded that I should try to stop the war. Normally, I would have called for their arrest, because they were members of Biafran Exco. They were party to the last meeting we held with Ojukwu to ask Ojukwu to go to the conference that was to hold in Monrovia, Liberia. That conference was engineered by Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe. It was this meeting that we arranged laboriously for where Ojukwu could stay so that there won’t be any sabotage against us. Hence, Felix Houphet- Boigny was one of those that recognised Biafran efforts. And the French were also partially assisting us. So, from Liberia, it was planned to move Ojukwu to Gabon and then to Ivory Coast.

But we hadn’t settled down in Ivory Coast in readiness for the meeting when members of the EXco came requesting that I should bring the war to an end. How come then you were the man everybody wanted to see to end the war? I was the person in charge of operations. I was also visible. Yes, I was. Do you think because the Yoruba officers were the ones that saw to the end of the war, it has caused any friction between them and the Igbo people? No, because a day after my declaration, I started the announcement from 9a.m. Every 15 minutes, my broadcast was on. Sir Louis Mbanefo crafted the statement that we gave Philip Effiong to read. After it was read, it became necessary because in my broadcast, we said we had sent emissaries to various Nigerian military formations to inform them that we had decided to end the war. It is only people with authority who could do that. Any army on the run will not make such statement. So, we did it on a friendly basis. Today Akin is still my friend. We meet from time to time. He visits me here too. No, it has not caused any friction at all. Why was it possible for the Owerri battle front to be inclusive as it were?

First and foremost, to take over Owerri was impossible. Owerri is the heartland of the Igbo nation. The heart land of our domain. Enugu is our foremost town which was prepared by the colonial masters as an administrative headquarters. Just as Lagos is to the West, even though Ibadan was the heartland of the Yoruba. So, also in the North, they have Kaduna State, which now they have Abuja, even though they have Sokoto, Maiduguiri and those other places. Nigeria is centered on a tripod, whichever way you push it, all that come to the surface are the Hausa nation, the Yoruba nation and the Igbo nation. Each of these nations has minorities. Today, all that people talk about are the minorities within the East, within the Igbo nation because of economic interest. If oil has not been the main source of income for the totality of Nigerians, nobody would care how the Ijaws, how the Itsekiris, the Ibibios, Kalabairis, the Efiks and so on, are faring. This is so because they’ve been in existence before the arrival of the Europeans.